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A Discourse of a Different Kind: On Fabulation




Man erfährt wieder bei dieser
Gelegenheit, daß eine vollständige
Erfahrung die Theorie in sich enthalten
muß. Um desto sichrer sind wir, daß wir
uns in einer Mitte begegnen, da wir von
so vielen Seiten auf die Sache losgehen.
—Goethe to Schiller, October 14, 1797
(Goethe, Gedenkausgabe, 439)
I
When the journal Die Horen began to appear in 1795, the responses to Schil-
ler’s speculative aesthetic contributions and to Goethe’s unorthodox Unter-
haltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten were not uniformly positive. “Viele
klagen über die abstrakten Materien,” reported Schiller to Goethe, “viele sind
auch an Ihren Unterhaltungen irre, weil sie, wie sie sich ausdrücken, noch
nicht absehen können, was damit werden soll. Sie sehen, unsre deutschen
Gäste verleugnen sich nicht; sie müssen immer wissen, was sie essen, wenn
es ihnen recht schmecken soll. Sie müssen Begriff davon haben” (Goethe,
Gedenkausgabe, 76; emphasis in original). Indeed, the Unterhaltungen have
a history of perplexing their readers, and literary criticism has a history of
seeking to pin down the novella’s elusive Begriff. Sufficiently inscrutable on
both a formal and a substantive level to resist many expectations we may
bring to the text, or conventions we may expect it to operate within, the
Unterhaltungen seem to compel interpreters either to conclude that they
largely defy interpretation, or, alternatively, to seize upon one strand or sub-
text within them, and put this forth as the true meaning behind the novella’s
inconstant structure. In the following, I will seek to explain the thinking that
underlies the shifting quality of the text, drawing first on Goethe’s philo-
466 Michael Saman
sophical dialogue with Schiller, out of which the idea for the Unterhaltungen
emerges; then tracing out the narrative treatment of central conceptual prob-
lems within the conversations of the emigrés; and, finally, exploring the way
the theoretical and methodological concerns in the frame narrative relate to
Goethe’s ideas on science, philosophy, and history. In this way, I show how
the Unterhaltungen take shape as an experimental synthesis between the rig-
orous empirical grounding of Goethe’s scientific work and the free play of
the literary imagination called for by Schillerian aesthetic theory, and how,
in turn, this synthesis has ramifications in different facets of Goethe’s thought.
In the past, many critics have been ungenerous. As Gerhard Fricke once
wrote:
Das Befremden und Kopfschütteln, mit dem in Weimar und anderswo das Bün-
del von Anekdoten und Geschichten aufgenommen wurde, das Goethe in den
beweglichen Rahmen seiner um Unterhaltung bemühten Revolutionsflüchtlinge
einfügte, ist, ob auch meist respektvoll kaschiert, bis heute ziemlich unverändert
geblieben – von einigen tollkühnen Versuchen abgesehen, symbolischen Tief-
sinn und paradigmatische Novellenvielfalt selbst da zu statuieren, wo ganz of-
fenbar ein gehaltloser Stoff schlecht erzählt und geistlos erörtert wird (Fricke,
273).
Bernd Witte, meanwhile, ventured to postulate “systematisch-historische[r]
Gehalt” in the novella, arguing that this cohesive aspect of the work “konnte
bis heute unentdeckt bleiben weil er im Gegensatz zu Schillers hohem Pathos
in scheinbar unverbindlichem Plauderton daherkommt und sich der eher zur
Unterhaltungsliteratur zu zählenden Gattungen der ‘gespenstermäßigen Mys-
tifikationsgeschichte’ und der moralischen ‘Familiengemälde’ bedient” (Witte,
462). More recently, Chenxi Tang has applied legal and political theory to
find, among the stories the emigrés tell, an “exaltation of the novella” that
raises the genre “to the very epitome of the poetic work of art” (Tang, 88).
Somehow, it is true that—paradoxically—the Unterhaltungen are both fraught
with apparent randomness and incongruity, and contructed around a distinct
conceptual underpinning. Further work remains to be done in order to explain
how these apparently contradictory characteristics come together within the
text.
If there is literary merit to be discerned amid the contentious chit-chat
and low-brow storytelling of the Unterhaltungen, or if there is a consistent
concept to be discerned within the whole, the burden proves to be very much
upon the reader to establish this. In fact, in a quite openly reflexive way, the
novella seems at one juncture to tell us as much: “Es kommt freilich vieles
auf die Beobachter an, und was für eine Seite man den Sachen abzugewinnen
weiß,” is the Old Man’s reply when Luise protests that his tales may be
without merit; “alles, was ich vorzubringen habe,” he concedes, “hat keinen
Wert an sich” (Goethe, Werke, vol. 6, 145). An absence of intrinsic merit,
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the Old Man asserts, needn’t stop his interlocutors from construing something
meaningful in the tales—at least if they know how to look at things the right
way. The Baroness, for her part, takes a starkly contrasting view, insisting
that stories should aspire to the “Einheit des Gedichts” (166). While arguing
over the stories they tell each other, the characters in the novella seem thus
to be arguing also about the very narrative—and indeed the genre—they
themselves are part of. Whether we choose to view the Unterhaltungen
through the eyes of the Old Man or through the ideals of the Baroness—i.e.,
whether we regard them as a messy textual inkblot or as a pristine poetic
unity—what comes to the foreground either way is the process of judgment
by which the reader goes about determining meaning or unity in them.
Heather Sullivan has argued that the crux of the text is to be found in its
“play with perception, interpretation, and the senses as part of our dynamic
interactions with the world.” This viewpoint is, I believe, entirely correct;
more than that, if we press it to its fullest iteration, it can free us from dis-
tracting questions about whether the “true” meaning of the Unterhaltungen
has to do with politics, or aesthetics, or science, or philosophy, etc. Following
Sullivan’s foregrounding of perception, we are able to answer that the novella
is ultimately about none and all of these fields: none, because it deals with
fundamental epistemological questions that cannot be constrained to any sin-
gle area of inquiry; and all, because, of course, all areas of serious methodical
inquiry are predicated upon certain principles and practices of observation
and judgment. As Sullivan claims, “Goethe concentrates on a grounded in-
teraction with our surroundings that might shift our understanding of every-
thing” (152; emphasis in original). Gerhard Neumann has characterized Goe-
the’s work around 1800 as forming part of a broader “Umordnung von
Wissensstrukturen” and a “Polyfokalisierung der Wahrnehmung” character-
istic of the post-Enlightenment era. Well beyond the specific scope of liter-
ature, Goethe’s work participates in a sweeping epistemological shift marked
by a “lebhafte[r] mehrseitige[r] Transfer zwischen Naturwissenschaften, Ge-
schichte [und] Philosophie” and distinguished, in Goethe’s work in particular,
by a “Neubestimmung des Verhältnisses von Einzelnem und Ganzem durch
die neuen Leitbegriffe des Aperçus und des Symbols” (Neumann, 472; em-
phasis in original). In line with this profound rethinking of the structure of
knowledge itself, the main narrative of the Unterhaltungen is organized to a
great extent around the very question Neumann specifies: the relation of the
particular to the universal, of the empirical to the ideal.1 The theorization of
these issues can be followed, Neumann observes, not only in Goethe’s literary
and scientific writings, but also in his epistolary exchange with Schiller. “Das
Briefgespräch zwischen Schiller und Goethe kreiste immer wieder um die
eine Schwierigkeit, wie im einzelnen Faktum, im augenblicklichen Erlebnis
die Idee des Ganzen, ein allgemeiner Sinn zu fassen und zu halten sei, wie
das individuell Erfahrene sich mit dem generellen Sinn vermitteln lasse” (498;
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emphasis in original). In order to appreciate the philosophical stakes of the
Unterhaltungen, we must then begin with this dialogue, in which the novella
was conceived.
II
The mutual intellectual push and pull that marked Goethe’s incipient col-
laboration with Schiller forms not only the backdrop, but indeed much of the
very substance of the Unterhaltungen.2 In 1794, Schiller had conceived of a
new literary journal, Die Horen, to serve the aesthetic cultivation of the Ger-
man intelligentsia and broader reading public, and began actively wooing
Goethe as co-editor and contributor. Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre had just
been completed, and Goethe and Schiller both initially thought this novel
would be well suited for serialization in the first issues of the journal; how-
ever, it had already been promised to a different publisher, leaving Goethe
and Schiller to brainstorm ideas for a brand new piece for Goethe to write.
Having recently completed a major novel, however, Goethe was quite eager
to get away, at least for the time being, from the strenuous demands of such
ambitious and complex writing: “Zu kleinen Erzählungen habe ich große
Lust,” he writes to Schiller, “nach der Last, die einem so ein Pseudo-Epos,
als der Roman ist, auflegt” (Goethe, Gedenkausgabe, 40). This being the case,
the prospect of starting a work from scratch came to be not merely a necessary
evil, but actually a desirable circumstance that allowed Goethe to proceed
with greater levity and freedom, and, at the same time, to remain open to
Schiller’s ongoing input as both intellectual confidant and editor. “His enthu-
siasm for the new project was boundless,” writes Nicholas Boyle, and Goethe
“overflowed with suggestions: a series of verse epistles for the opening issues,
a retelling of stories from Boccaccio’s French imitators, a correspondence
with Schiller on aesthetics that could begin straight away and be printed as
it grew” (Boyle, 228). The Episteln did come to be written, and were pub-
lished in the first two issues. At Schillers encouragement, Goethe also de-
veloped two tales by François de Bassompierre into the “schöne Krämerin”
and the “Geschichte vom Schleier” that appear in the Unterhaltungen. The
model of Boccaccio’s Decameron, in which the telling of stories serves to
pass the time and to offer needed diversion during the Plague, is central in
the Unterhaltungen, which is constructed around a parallel between the
Plague in Boccaccio’s Italy and the political instability of 1790s Germany.
The idea of a dialogue with Schiller on aesthetics, moreover, to be published
“as it grew,” came likewise to be realized—though not explicitly—by incor-
poration into the fabric of the Unterhaltungen themselves.
In a manner Schiller probably would not have expected, Goethe—who
was so frank about his willingness to explore whatever sort of material Schil-
ler felt would be effective for the aims of Die Horen—did indeed take the
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opportunity to set Schillerian ideas into play, and thereby in effect to conduct
a literary experiment as to the possibility of a literary synthesis of their re-
spective paradigms of thought. Schiller’s and Goethe’s broad aims in terms
of the kind of cultural politics that the times called for were largely compat-
ible, yet key aspects of their philosophical principles were deeply at odds—
a fact that created a productive tension between them, and that, one may
surmise, made all the more intriguing for Goethe the idea of constructing
what critics have identified as his “Gegenentwurf,” his “epische[-] Kontra-
faktur,” his “fabulierende[s] Nachzeichnen” of Schiller’s letters Über die äs-
thetische Erziehung des Menschen, which were serialized in Die Horen si-
multaneously with the Unterhaltungen (Gaier, 211; Pfaff, 321; Mommsen,
504). The observation that Goethe was in a certain sense rewriting Schiller’s
ideas runs the risk of being rather oversimplified, however, for the significant
differences that inhere between narrative fiction and theoretical aesthetics in
general, and between Goethe’s keen empiricism and Schiller’s speculative
thought in particular, yield conceptual disjunctions that demand considerable
creativity on the part of the author in order to bridge them in a narrative work.
Perhaps inevitably, the result of this process is some rather unconventional
storytelling. Serialized in Die Horen while they were still in the process of
being written, the Unterhaltungen reflect the fact that Goethe had the possi-
bility to adjust the structure and material of the text as he went along, grad-
ually reorienting the overall trajectory of the narrative, responding to new
events and ideas, and even constructing in this process a dialogue with other
pieces appearing in Die Horen. Due to this manner of being published piece
by piece and being thought through progressively as it appeared, the work
must be seen as developing very much in real time—a fact that contrasts
markedly with most of Goethe’s Weimar-era output. Unlike earlier works of
the Sturm und Drang period, for example, the relatively spontaneous com-
position of which, with little revision afterward, was typical of the aesthetics
and temperament of the time, Goethe’s more canonical work of the Weimar
period tended to be the product of careful reflection, and often the accumu-
lation of many years of work. The resulting contrast with a book such as
Wilhelm Meister, which appeared around the same time, is what has helped
earn the Unterhaltungen their reputation as something of a “Kuckucksei”
within Goethe’s literary oeuvre (Gaier, 225). The fact that they reflect an
exploratory philosophical dialogue with a new interlocutor also contributes
to their eclectic aesthetic.
In contrast to the much more orthodoxly Kantian Schiller, Goethe cat-
egorically rejected the desirability or even the possibility of abstracting ideas
into a speculative realm where they would be separated from the real. Such
a separation, however, was a central tenet of Schiller’s thought, and Goethe
remained skeptical of the transcendental philosophical apparatus that Schiller
applied to his political and aesthetic thinking. Both Schiller and Goethe were
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very cognizant of this difference; as Schiller writes to Goethe at the outset of
their correspondence:
Mir fehlte das Objekt, der Körper zu mehreren spekulativischen Ideen, und Sie
brachten mich auf die Spur davon. Ihr beobachtender Blick, der so still und
rein auf den Dingen ruht, setzt Sie nie in Gefahr, auf den Abweg zu geraten,
in den sowohl die Spekulation als die willkürliche und bloß sich selbst gehor-
chende Einbildungskraft sich so leicht verirrt. [ . . . ] Beim ersten Anblicke zwar
scheint es, als könnte es keine größere Opposita geben, als den spekulativen
Geist, der von der Einheit, und den intuitiven, der von der Mannigfaltigkeit
ausgeht. Sucht aber der erste mit keuschem und treuem Sinn die Erfahrung, and
sucht der letzte mit selbsttätiger freier Denkkraft das Gesetz, so kann es gar
nicht fehlen, daß nicht beide einander auf halbem Wege begegnen werden (Goe-
the, Gedenkausgabe, 13 and 15).
Goethe, for his part, was likewise eager for Schiller’s input towards increasing
the purview and precision of his Denkkraft, and therefore readily accepted
the invitation to let their minds meet halfway, even though—or perhaps pre-
cisely because—as Goethe concedes, “[i]ch komme mir gar wunderlich vor,
wenn ich theoretisieren soll” (30). An experiment in synthesizing “Opposita”
is thus the basic project at hand.
Meanwhile, the French Revolution and its aftermath—in this case, the
War of the First Coalition—were what lent these matters more than just theo-
retical urgency, and the question of how to engage with this historical exi-
gency becomes a testing ground for their ideas. Schiller’s response to devel-
opments in France had gone through more marked changes than had Goethe’s:
Schiller initially supported the revolution on the basis of its ideals, but, in-
creasingly taken aback by its violent repercussions, renounced this support
and began to conceive literary projects intended to help bring about a more
humane society, free of such brutality. As is made clear in the “Ankündigung”
for Die Horen, the journal was expressly conceived toward this end. The
“Ankündigung” is worth closer consideration because it not only formulates
in nuce the general system of idealistic aesthetics to which Goethe would so
directly be responding as he composed the Unterhaltungen, but it also states
the specific expectations for the contributions being sought for the journal—
expectations that Goethe, with an inimitable mix of irony and sincerity, would
transpose, with a twist, into fictional form. Schiller writes:
Je mehr die allgemeine Aufmerksamkeit durch die lebhafteste Teilnahme an
den politischen Begebenheiten des Tages und den Kampf entgegengesetzter
Meinungen und Parteien jetzt auf die Gegenwart gerichtet ist, desto dringender
wird das Bedürfnis, die dadurch eingeengten Gemüter durch ein allgemeineres
und höheres Interesse an allem, was rein, menschlich und über den Einfluß der
Zeiten erhaben ist, wiederum in Freiheit zu setzen und dem durch den Anblick
der Zeitbegebenheiten ermüdeten Leser eine fröhliche Zerstreuung zu verschaf-
fen (Schiller, 110).
Fabulation and Method in Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten 471
While it is clear why Goethe will have been receptive to the idea of a literary
remedy to the political crises of the day, we can, at the same time, clearly
see manifestations in this passage of the separation that Goethe questioned
between the transcendental subject matter of the intellect and the concrete
manifold of experience. Unlike Goethe’s thought, Schiller’s is predicated
upon there being something “rein, menschlich und über den Einfluß der Zeiten
erhaben” that can be written on in lieu of the actual political vicissitudes of
the here and now. Schiller thus proposes, in effect, a discursive retreat into a
‘purely’ aesthetic discursive space that stands in opposition to the “Begeben-
heiten des Tages.” This becomes more explicit as the “Ankündigung” con-
tinues:
Sich alle Beziehung auf den jetzigen Weltlauf und die nächsten Erwartungen
der Menschheit verbietend, wird [die Zeitung] mit Hilfe der Geschichte und
Philosophie zu dem Ideale veredelter Menschheit die einzelnen Züge sammeln
und an dem stillen Bau besserer Begriffe, reinerer Grundsätze und edlerer Sitten
nach Vermögen geschäftig sein (110; emphases in original).
With the realms of the political and the aesthetic set into opposition such that
the writings in Die Horen should constitute, as Schiller writes, “Unterhaltung
von ganz entgegengesetzter Art” vis-à-vis the otherwise ubiquitous “Staats-
kritik” of the day (106), he is, paradoxically, soliciting texts that will some-
how seek to ameliorate the crisis precisely by not addressing it. Goethe goes
along with the ultimate intention of this project—the aim of offering edifi-
cation and diversion in a time of “allgemeiner Verwirrung und Not” (Goethe,
Werke, vol. 6, 128)—but he perceives an absurdity in the way Schiller models
his approach. One must not, on Goethe’s view, seek to abstract and refine
one’s discourse until it loses contact with its actual subject matter; rather,
literary discourse must bring forth the complexity of things. Therefore, while
Goethe by and large adheres to Schiller’s requests and directives, he composes
most of his narrative in a most down-to-earth and concrete manner that resists
any manner of rarefied abstraction, thereby producing, ultimately, an “Unter-
haltung von ganz entgegengesetzter Art” to that which Schiller had actually
intended.
III
“Gegensätze,” indeed, are what provide the first thrust of the work’s framing
narrative, with the idea of telling tales being a direct result of the confrontation
between the sympathizer of the revolution, Karl, and the sympathizer of the
ancien régime, the Privy Councillor—a pair of opposing temperaments and
intellects that represent the incommensurability between passionate idealism
(personified by Karl) and unbudging clinging to certainty and experience
(personified by the Privy Councillor). “[Karl] hatte sich [ . . . ] von der blen-
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denden Schönheit verführen lassen, die unter dem Namen Freiheit sich erst
heimlich, dann öffentlich so viele Anbeter zu verschaffen wußte und, so übel
sie auch die einen behandelte, von den andern mit großer Lebhaftigkeit ver-
ehrt wurde” (127). The characterization of Karl focuses not only on his intense
fixation on an ideal, but also on the concomitant devaluation in his worldview
of any actually existing, concrete quantities: “Stand, Glücksgüter, alle Ver-
hältnisse scheinen in Nichts zu verschwinden, indem das gewünschte Gut zu
Einem, zu Allem wird” (127). The Privy Councillor remarks, “mit einiger
Bitterkeit,” that Karl is exemplary of those “junge Leute, die einen Gegen-
stand zu idealisieren geneigt seien” (133). The Privy Councillor, by contrast,
is characterized as being “genau im Reden und Handeln,” as holding rigidly
to principle, and as both commanding confidence in others and demanding
reliability from them (129). To the Baroness, he is, “so wunderlich er auch
in manchen Stücken sein mag, doch ein trefflicher, rechtschaffener Mann
[ . . . ] [der] ein unerschöpfliches Archiv von Menschen- und Weltkenntnissen,
von Begebenheiten und Verhältnissen mit sich führt, die er auf eine leichte,
glückliche und angenehme Weise mitzuteilen versteht” (135). To his antipode
Karl, though, he is—for the same reasons—a caricature of “diejenigen [ . . . ],
welche nur nach alten Formen denken könnten und, was dahinein nicht passe,
notwendig verwerfen müßten.” The confrontation between them thus exem-
plifies the respective perils of a mode of thinking that locates its ‘one and all’
purely in the ideal, and of one that, by stubborn refusal of speculation, reduces
itself to being merely and unimaginatively ‘archival.’ Between individuals of
these mindsets, as we are shown, genuine conversation simply is not possible,
but rather only a gladiatorial “Hin- und Widerreden.” Accordingly, the con-
versation between them becomes “immer heftiger, und es kam von beiden
Seiten alles zur Sprache, was im Laufe dieser Jahre so manche gute Gesell-
schaft entzweit hatte.” The Privy Councillor even escalates his contempt for
people of Karl’s persuasions to the point of expressing his wish, “sie alle
gehangen zu sehen.” Karl likewise escalates the force of his words until he
avows “daß er den französischen Waffen alles Glück wünsche,” and, as soon
as the Revolution should take hold in Germany, “daß die Guillotine auch in
Deutschland eine gesegnete Ernte finden und kein schuldiges Haupt verfehlen
werde” (133). The bitter “Kampf entgegengestzter Meinungen und Parteien”
Schiller spoke of is thus vividly exemplified here.
The Unterhaltungen consequently present the “traurigen Augenblicke
des Loslösens und Scheidens” that accompany the departure of the Privy
Councillor and his wife from the group as the inevitable consequence of
failing to reconcile extremes. Up to this point, the Baroness remarks, the
untempered “Gemüter” of her fellow travellers have seemed “so blind und
unaufhaltsam [zu] wirken und drein[zu]schlagen wie die Weltbegebenheiten,
ein Gewitter oder ein ander Naturphänomen”; moderation and reflection have
hitherto fallen short (135). Moved by her sadness at her friends’ parting to
Fabulation and Method in Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten 473
address the destructiveness of such one-sided adherence to one’s own ideas
and inclinations, the Baroness reminds her companions “wieviel wir sonst
schon, ehe alle diese Sachen zur Sprache kamen, um gesellig zu sein, von
unsern Eigenschaften aufopfern mußten, und daß jeder, solange die Welt ste-
hen wird, um gesellig zu sein, wenigstens äußerlich sich wird beherrschen
müssen” (137). The Baroness’s exhortations represent a version of Goethe’s
notion of Entsagung, each individual being called upon to temper his or her
expectations with respect to the exigencies of the situation: “Bietet alle eure
Kräfte auf, lehrreich, nützlich und besonders gesellig zu sein!” (139). As the
subsequent discussions show, the idea will be for the idealist concretely to
substantiate the ideal he wishes to represent, and likewise for the empirical
‘archivist’ to venture systematically to reflect upon and to extrapolate from
his experience. This new imperative—aiming to move human conduct past
the unpredictability of Weltbegebenheiten and Naturphänomene—provides
the thrust for the remainder of the novella.
The ethos of Geselligkeit through Entsagung finds the wholehearted
approval of the Old Man:
Jeder Mensch kann ohne die mindeste Rückkehr auf sich selbst an allem, was
neu ist, lebhaften Anteil nehmen; ja, da eine Folge von Neuigkeiten immer von
einem Gegenstande zum andern fortreißt, so kann der großen Menschenmasse
nichts willkommner sein als ein solcher Anlaß zu ewiger Zerstreuung und eine
solche Gelegenheit, Tücke und Schadenfreude auf eine bequeme und immer
sich erneuernde Weise auszulassen.
These comments, however, are greeted by the immediate objections of Luise,
who questions the universalizing leap that he so casually seems to be making:
“[ . . . ] sonst ging es über einzelne Personen her, jetzt soll es das ganze
menschliche Geschlecht entgelten,” she protests (141). At the outset of the
novella, it had been noted how highly individualized and pronounced—“cha-
rakteristisch” and “auffallend”—the personalities of the emigrés were, their
temperamental differences being amplified all the more by the precarious
political circumstances (125). The Old Man’s wish for them now to harmonize
as a “groß[e] Menschenmasse” seems therefore to demand much too rapid a
leap from stark individuality to undifferentiated collectivity. Luise is equally
disapproving when the Old Man speaks of the “Sammlung” of stories he
proposes to tell: “Gewiß nichts weiter als eine skandalöse Chronik” (142),
she surmises, assuming that too simple a story—i.e., one lacking in added
ideal value—must surely be morally debased. Luise thus objects as much to
exaggerated claims of a given narrative’s universal applicability as she does
to the telling of a one-dimensional narrative with no resonance beyond its
literal content. So the problem at issue in this key dialogue in the Unterhal-
tungen is that of balancing the respective symbolic values of the universal
and the particular into an intelligible and also morally relevant narrative syn-
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thesis. This is the same question of speculation versus experience as in the
preceding Karl/Privy Councillor episode, or, of course, in the Goethe/Schiller
philosophical contrast that underlies all of this, but this time it is mediated
through a consensus-seeking ethos of dialogue rather than opposition. “Ich
sehe wohl, wo Sie hinauswollen,” says the Baroness to the Old Man, but is
sure to admonish him: “machen Sie es aber auch ihr [Luise] begreiflich”
(144). On the literal level, all of this is presented by Goethe as constituting
so much banal chatter over the possible indecency of the Old Man’s stories,
but the tenor of the narration and dialogue is deceptive. What Goethe is testing
is the potential of literary narrative to bridge the gap between experience and
ideas—a question with much greater ramifications than just the sensibilities
of the fictional Luise.
IV
The convention, which I follow here, is to refer to the Unterhaltungen as a
“novella,” though this designation is in some ways problematic, as the text
is composed of too many discrete parts (the main narrative, plus the seven
tales the characters tell) to be considered a single, unified work. A designation
that avoids this problem is “Novellenzyklus,” yet this too strongly fore-
grounds the tales told by the characters, and thereby casts the central narrative
as only a device to string them together. This, too, is an inadequate charac-
terization. The tales told by the emigrés are, to borrow a phrase from the
Baroness, something more like “Parallelgeschichten” that experimentally al-
low the ideas of the main narrative to resonate more widely through depiction
in varying contexts. “Eine deutet auf die andere hin,” says the Baroness, “und
erklärt ihren Sinn besser als viele trockene Worte” (187). These tales, though,
always lead back to the main narrative, and function to a certain extent as
attempts to carry out the ideal of Geselligkeit to which the Baroness has
challenged the group—the success or failure of each attempt becoming re-
newed material for discussion, thereby serving to sustain the ongoing con-
versation that forms the main narrative. This structure consistently focuses
our attention not so much on the content of each tale told, as back onto the
debate among the emigrés concerning the plausibility and value of each story.
Witte has argued that the Unterhaltungen can be seen as “eine Versuchsa-
nordnung [ . . . ], mit der die Ohnmacht der bisher üblichen Literatur ange-
sichts der gesellschaftlich-politischen Umbruchsituation dem literarischen
Fachmann vor Augen geführt werden sollte” (Witte, 472). The sequence of
the narrative “experiments” the emigrés present—each successive tale stand-
ing as a Versuch for the group collectively to assess before proceeding to the
next—takes on a character more formally consistent, in certain respects, with
a process of scientific experimentation than with any obvious literary model.
One interpretive approach to the Unterhaltungen, which Tang has taken, is
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to focus primarily on the seven stories, finding within their progression Goe-
the’s “aesthetic remedy” to political crisis (Tang, 79). An alternative, and, I
think, complementary approach—which I follow here—is to train attention
on the main narrative and the “explicit focus” it brings to “questions of per-
ception once the revolutionary background has been established and the sto-
ries have begun” (Sullivan, 156).
The tale of the singer Antonelli is introduced as “eine Geschichte, die
großes Aufsehen erregte und worüber die Urteile sehr verschieden waren”
(Goethe, Werke, vol. 6, 146)—and indeed, differences in judgment are exactly
what it elicits. Once it has been told, the emigrés begin “ihre Gedanken und
Zweifel über diese Geschichte zu äußern, ob sie wahr sei, ob sie auch wahr
sein könne” (156). Next, Fritz’s tale of the “Klopfgeist” is introduced as
“gleichfalls eine Geschichte [ . . . ], die zwar der vorigen an Interesse nicht
gleiche, aber doch auch von der Art sei, daß man sie niemals mit völliger
Gewißheit habe erklären können” (157). Upon hearing Fritz’s story, the Old
Man expresses his regret that determining the true nature of events is not
easier:
“Wenn es nur nicht überhaupt so schwer wäre zu untersuchen,” sagte der Alte,
“und in dem Augenblicke, wo etwas dergleichen begegnet, die Punkte und
Momente alle gegenwärtig zu haben, worauf es eigentlich ankommt, damit man
nichts entwischen lasse, worin Betrug und Irrtum sich verstecken könne. Ver-
mag man denn einem Taschenspieler so leicht auf die Sprünge zu kommen,
von dem wir doch wissen, daß er uns zum besten hat?” (159).3
Karl—likewise acknowledging the difficulty, or perhaps even impossibility,
of reliably ascertaining states of affairs—asserts that any attempt to explain
a phenomenon through a broader explanatory scheme must necessarily lead
to error.
“Überhaupt,” sagte Karl, “scheint mir, daß jedes Phänomen so wie jedes Fak-
tum an sich eigentlich das Interessante sei. Wer es erklärt oder mit andern
Begebenheiten zusammenhängt, macht sich gewöhnlich eigentlich nur einen
Spaß und hat uns zum besten, wie zum Beispiel der Naturforscher und Histo-
rienschreiber. Aber eine einzelne Handlung oder Begebenheit ist interessant,
nicht weil sie erklärbar oder wahrscheinlich, sondern weil sie wahr ist” (161).
With this foregrounding of our faculty of judgment, and these cautions re-
garding possible inductive error, one senses the concerns of the author who
has engaged since his return from Italy with the writings of Kant, and has
begun directing a major part of his scientific efforts toward demonstrating the
error he perceives in Newton’s system.4 The Baroness had, in her earlier
rebuke to her fellow travellers, cited Naturphänomene and Weltbegebenheiten
as paradigms of apparent arbitrariness and unpredictability; here, in a similar
way, Karl points to the interpreters of nature and history as exemplars of
systematic judgmental error. While any single discrete fact is already difficult
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to observe with true accuracy,5 any connections drawn between different ob-
servations will entail a yet greater order of complexity, and therefore a greater
level of uncertainty. Explanatory theories, Goethe skeptically suggests, may
ultimately reflect the judgment of an individual theorist more than they do
the reality itself that they seek to explain. On the surface, there seems at this
point in the Unterhaltungen to be little at stake beyond the plausibility of an
extemporaneously told ghost story; to clarify the deeper epistemological
stakes behind the conversation, then, the framework of the novella will now
shift once again.
The problem of explaining unlikely events is given an all new imme-
diacy when the emigrés are startled by “ein sehr starker Knall,” which turns
out to be caused by the mysterious, and apparently spontaneous, breaking of
a nearby desk. With this occurrence, the task of accounting for the uncanny
is brought out of the realm of mere Unterhaltung, and into their own imme-
diate situation. The cause of the loud noise is immediately explained once
Fritz shines light on the desk: “Die gewölbte Decke desselben was quer völlig
durchgerissen; man hatte also die Ursache des Klanges.” The emigrés are
mystified, though, as to why the desk, built by one of Germany’s most rep-
utable artisans, should have cracked at all: “dieser Schreibtisch von Röntgens
bester Arbeit” had long been regarded “als Muster einer vortrefflichen und
dauerhafter Tischlerarbeit, [ . . . ] und nun sollte er auf einmal reißen, ohne
daß in der Luft die mindeste Veränderung zu spüren war” (159). The barom-
eter and the thermometer showed no readings that would explain the event,
and the hygrometer they would need in order to measure the air’s moisture
was not at hand. “‘Es scheint’ sagte der Alte, ‘daß uns immer die nötigsten
Instrumente abgehen, wenn wir Versuche auf Geister anstellen wollen’”
(160). Referring, of course, to the ghost stories previously told, the Old Man
means, on the face of it, that scientific instruments cannot suffice to explain
the paranormal, yet at this point in the novella, ghost stories are actually no
longer the matter at hand. Rather, what is being tested are the intellects—the
Geister—of the emigrés, who are now compelled to grapple with a real event
that—unlike a ghost story—cannot be written off on the basis of apparent
implausibility. With an entirely concrete experience before them, they now
find themselves with no devices other than their minds and their senses to get
from the observed fact to some manner of explanation. With this event, then,
the different levels of the narrative begin to collapse into one another such
that all of the discussions regarding the evaluation of narrative suddenly apply
directly to reality as well. Is the seemingly spontaneous breaking of the desk
in essence any different from the mysterious knocking in the “Klopfgeist”
story? Is it possible to find a real reason? How do we test our explanations?
How much do we trust others’, or even our own, explanations? As the char-
acters now begin debating the plausibility of what they see with their own
eyes, what began as social chatter over moral ways to pass the time develops
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by the end of the novella into the question of a hermeneutics of the actual
concrete present. At this juncture, we arrive at the core problem and provo-
cation that Goethe presents: phenomena in and of themselves are ultimately
unknowable to us, and narratives through which we attempt to explain them
to ourselves are tentative and hypothetical constructions of which we must
always remain suspicious. Is Karl right, Goethe seems to be asking—do our
ideas have a true connection with the intrinsic nature of things, or are they
just an Unterhaltung of sorts, a conceptual illusion that placates us in the face
of the overwhelming incongruity of experience?
Fritz, undaunted, offers a theory for the Röntgen desk’s breaking that—
much like the earlier ghost stories—tests the line between the plausible and
the fantastic:
Ihr wißt, daß unsre Mutter schon vor mehreren Jahren einen ähnlichen, ja man
möchte sagen, einen gleichen Schreibtisch an unsre Tante geschenkt hat. Beide
waren zu Einer Zeit aus Einem Holze mit der größten Sorgfalt von Einem
Meister verfertigt, beide haben sich bisher trefflich gehalten, und ich wollte
wetten, daß in diesem Augenblicke mit dem Lusthause unsrer Tante der zweite
Schreibtisch verbrennt und daß sein Zwillingsbruder auch davon leidet. Ich will
mich morgen selbst aufmachen und dieses seltsame Faktum so gut als möglich
zu berichtigen suchen (160–161).
And indeed, the next day Fritz ascertains that, in a fire, the aunt’s twin Rönt-
gen desk had also cracked. Moreover, a clock that had stood upon it was
found standing still, displaying the time 11:30—exactly the time the evening
before when the emigrés had heard the other desk break. “Wir haben also,
wenigstens was die Zeit betrifft, eine völlige Übereinstimmung,” Fritz notes
(208). This forms a test, then, of Karl’s skeptical view of things. Is the isolated
fact of the one desk breaking indeed the only matter of interest? Is a hypo-
thetical causal connection with the breaking of the other desk something that
should be seriously entertained? Or is such speculation merely “ein Spaß”?
True to the Old Man’s earlier remark, this seems to depend altogether on the
observer:
Die Baronesse lächelte, der Hofmeister behauptete, daß, wenn zwei Dinge zu-
sammenträfen, man deswegen noch nicht auf ihren Zusammenhang schließen
könne. Luisen gefiel es dagegen, diese beiden Vorfälle zu verknüpfen, beson-
ders da sie von dem Wohlbefinden ihres Bräutigams Nachricht erhalten hatte,
und man ließ der Einbildungskraft abermals vollkommen freien Lauf (208).
While Karl’s earnest attempt at scientifically sound inquiry does its best to
grapple with empirical events, the mysterious event gives the disparate tem-
peraments of the emigrés room to freely assert themselves once again, and,
far from a consensus brought about by reason, it is the imagination that begins
to gain the upper hand. Yet the imagination—“die willkürliche und bloß sich
selbst gehorchende Einbildungskraft,” in Schiller’s words—is what was sup-
478 Michael Saman
posed to be tempered by connection to the concrete, while the wish for cer-
tainty was supposed to be leavened by greater speculative curiosity. Rather
than moving toward a higher synthesis, then, the mindsets represented in the
main narrative seem so far only to remain stubbornly disparate and conflicted,
giving rise to an awkwardly halting narrative. Reading the Unterhaltungen
upon their publication, Christian Gottfried Körner regretfully remarked that
Goethe’s writing seemed to be going “decrescendo” (quoted in Goethe, Sämt-
liche Werke, 1524), and in the unapologetic formal disunity and conceptual
instability that mark the main narrative, one can see the reason for his dis-
content. Instead of synthesizing toward an ever more crystallized narrative
structure, the elements of Goethe’s storytelling so far seem analytically to be
coming apart. The thinking behind this counterintuitive development may
best be explained, I will argue, in connection with the scientific principles
that Goethe is in the process of refining at this time.
V
Instinctively, Goethe writes, when we encounter phenomena, we tend—like
the emigrés—first to assess them in relation to our individual interests; the
untrained observer, not yet aspiring to objectivity, will judge things first and
foremost in terms of whether “sie ihm gefallen oder mißfallen, ob sie ihn
anziehen oder abstoßen, ob sie ihm nutzen oder schaden.” Upon attaining a
higher and more selfless perspective, though, the individual is able to bracket
out subjective inclinations, and begins to judge phenomena less in relation to
one’s own interests, and instead “aus dem Kreise der Dinge [ . . . ] die er
beobachtet” (Goethe, Werke, vol. 13, 10). The hazard, though, is that as we
move from the initial unreflected mode of judgment to a higher level of ob-
servation, we necessarily form concepts to explain what we see, and, ironi-
cally, the conceptual apparatus that we thus construct risks eclipsing our per-
ception of the very phenomena they were meant to explain. As Goethe writes
in a 1792 essay on what he calls “die Kautelen des Beobachters” (Goethe,
Gedenkausgabe, 598):
Der Mensch erfreut sich nämlich mehr an der Vorstellung als an der Sache,
oder wir müssen vielmehr sagen: der Mensch erfreut sich nur einer Sache,
insofern er sich dieselbe vorstellt, sie muß in seine Sinnesart passen, und er
mag seine Vorstellungsart noch so hoch über die gemeine erheben, noch so
sehr reinigen, so bleibt sie doch gewöhnlich nur eine Vorstellungsart; das heißt
ein Versuch, viele Gegenstände in ein gewisses faßliches Verhältnis zu bringen,
das sie, streng genommen, untereinander nicht haben, daher die Neigung zu
Hypothesen, zu Theorien, Terminologien und Systemen, die wir nicht miß-
billigen können, weil sie aus der Organisation unsers Wesens notwendig ent-
springen müssen (Goethe, Werke, vol. 13, 15–16).
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Later renamed “Der Versuch als Vermittler von Objekt und Subjekt,” this
essay centers around the possible pitfalls of perception, and presents a set of
preparatory methodological cautions—Kautelen, in Goethe’s parlance—for
the scientific observer. The point Goethe makes is that some of the most
formidable obstructions to our understanding of the world inhere not only in
the intrinsic complexity of the world itself, but also in the eye—or in the
mind—of the observer. “Der Versuch” therefore intends to alert the scientist
to the “inner enemies” that may obtrude between him or her and the object
of observation.
Man kann sich daher nicht genug in acht nehmen, daß man aus Versuchen nicht
zu geschwind folgere, daß man aus Versuchen nicht unmittelbar etwas bewei-
sen, noch irgendeine Theorie durch Versuche bestätigen wolle; denn hier an
diesem Passe, beim Übergang von der Erfahrung zum Urteil, von der Erkennt-
nis zur Anwendung ist es, wo dem Menschen alle seine inneren Feinde auflau-
ern, Einbildungskraft, die ihn schon da mit ihren Fittichen in die Höhe hebt,
wenn er noch immer den Erdboden zu berühren glaubt, Ungeduld, Vorschnel-
ligkeit, Selbstzufriedenheit, Steifheit, Gedankenform, vorgefaßte Meinung, Be-
quemlichkeit, Leichtsinn, Veränderlichkeit, und wie die ganze Schar mit ihrem
Gefolge heißen mag, alle liegen hier im Hinterhalte und überwältigen unver-
sehens den handelnden, so auch den stillen, von allen Leidenschaften gesichert
scheinenden Beobachter (14–15).
The problem of how to venture from the particular to the general while still
maintaining the “grounded interaction with our surroundings” that anchors
Goethe’s thought (Sullivan, 152) is neatly articulated here, as is the catalogue
of tendencies, attitudes, and errors—many personified by various of the emi-
grés—that may blur judgment and obscure truth. Indeed, the above passage
can easily be read as a more detailed articulation of the same complexities of
judgment represented by the characters, their stories, and the connecting dis-
cussions in the Unterhaltungen. But beyond explaining the conceptual con-
cerns that form much of the dialogue in the novella, Goethe’s principles of
scientific practice can be shown even to directly inform the narrative form
the novella takes.
Just as aesthetic and scientific judgment operate at different levels of
objectivity and detachment, Goethe argues in “Der Versuch als Vermittler”
that the production of artistic and scientific texts proceeds in distinct ways,
differing, for example, in the manner in which they are most effectively pre-
sented to their readership.
Denn ein Künstler tut wohl, sein Kunstwerk nicht öffentlich sehen zu lassen,
bis er es vollendet hat, weil nicht leicht jemand raten noch Beistand tun kann;
ist es hingegen vollendet, so hat er alsdenn den Tadel oder das Lob zu überlegen
und zu beherzigen, solches mit seiner Erfahrung zu vereinigen und sich dadurch
zu einem neuen Werke auszubilden und vorzubereiten. In wissenschaftlichen
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Dingen hingegen ist es schon nützlich, jede einzelne Erfahrung, ja Vermutung
öffentlich mitzuteilen, ja es ist höchst rätlich, ein wissenschaftliches Gebäude
nicht eher aufzuführen, bis der Plan dazu und die Materialien allgemein be-
kannt, beurteilt und ausgewählt sind (13–14).
This characterization of artistic versus scientific work compellingly matches
the distinction between, say, the Lehrjahre and the Unterhaltungen: The for-
mer was published only when the years-long work of conceptualization and
composition had been completed. The latter, by contrast, openly displays its
inconsistencies and unresolved questions; it was published, piece by piece,
as a work in progress, leaving the joints and sutures between its segments
still palpable; and, with its many conflicting narrative voices, it is collective
in composition, and is decidedly polyfocal in perspective rather than pre-
senting a unified authorial voice. Viewed in this light, the Unterhaltungen
may be regarded as a hybrid discourse of sorts, introducing scientific and
philosophical questions of method and logic into an experimental literary
form, and thereby yielding an unexpected discursive alloy.
Like Luise, who had protested at too quick a conceptual leap from the
individual to the entire human species, Goethe believes that too bold and
sweeping an attempt at synthesis is where great risk of error lies, and this is
why he claims to be ill at ease when called on to ‘theorize.’ “Dagegen werden
wir finden,” he concludes in “Der Versuch als Vermittler,” “daß diejenigen
am meisten geleistet haben, welche nicht ablassen alle Seiten und Modifi-
kationen einer einzigen Erfahrung, eines einzigen Versuches nach aller Mög-
lichkeit durchzuforschen und durchzuarbeiten” (17). The careful observation
of a specific fact can yield richer insight, he maintains, than the formulation
of the most ambitious general theory—so long as it proceeds in a sufficiently
polyfocal manner. It is a matter of observing phenomena with patience, and
turning them attentively to different angles in order to discern the different
facets of their meaning within the context they are part of. This, of course,
was the essence of the Old Man’s advice to Luise—and, implicitly, to the
reader in search of the novella’s ‘concept’: “Es kommt freilich vieles auf die
Beobachter an, und was für eine Seite man den Sachen abzugewinnen weiß.”
Goethe’s way of approaching the infinite is to approach the finite from every
angle available, and this is what he does in the Unterhaltungen, giving each
perspective its voice—even at the expense of narrative unity.
VI
“Geschichtliches Dasein,” writes Gerd Ueding, is in Goethe’s view “verwor-
renes Dasein, ist Wirrwarr, Irrung, Finsternis, weil es keine klare, abgegrenzte
Stufenfolge verschiedener Zustände und Begebenheiten gibt, die einander
zwanglos ablösen, sondern ein dauernder Wirbel von Verschlingungen”
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(Ueding, 129). Hartmut Reinhardt similarly argues that Goethe had come, by
the 1790s, to see the course of history as above all a matter of “Schicksal”—
a thing largely beyond our control, determined by chance more than by rea-
son, and as such “unfaßbar in ihrer Dynamik von diskontinuierlichen Sprün-
gen und Rückschlägen” (Reinhardt, 311). Indeed, the Unterhaltungen, as an
immediate product of the political and cultural climate of the mid-1790s, may
be seen as a corrective to philosophical constructions of history that Goethe
saw coming to prevalence at that time. Whereas a close associate such as
Herder will posit broad narratives that span centuries of human experience,
Goethe’s own reflections on generalizable laws of continuity and develop-
ment will be restricted largely to domains such as, say, plant metamorphosis,
in which change can more easily be empirically observed, and putative laws
more easily tested. In interpreting history, however, we do not have the same
possibility to make first-hand observations and to systematically test hypoth-
eses; to methodically observe and test broader arcs of human experience
would require a higher vantage than what our perspective affords us, and this
constraint forces us into speculation. Should our ideas venture too far beyond
our capacity for empirical observation, though, our work risks becoming,
Goethe suggests, increasingly a matter of imagination rather than of science.
Whereas in “Der Versuch als Vermittler” Goethe had presented a set of Kau-
telen for the scientific interpreters of Naturphänomene, we may regard the
Unterhaltungen as comprising conceptually analogous Kautelen for the phil-
osophical interpreters of Weltbegebenheiten. The hypotheses, theories, ter-
minologies, and systems that our intellects generate must not be fallaciously
ascribed to history itself, Goethe cautions, because they may have more to
do with our own intellectual constitution than with the actual nature of what
we interpret.
In “Bedenken und Ergebung,” a document from his later morphological
work, Goethe comments on the persisting difficulty
daß zwischen Idee und Erfahrung eine gewisse Kluft befestigt scheint, die zu
überschreiten unsere ganze Kraft sich vergeblich bemüht. Demohngeachtet
bleibt unser ewiges Bestreben diesen Hiatus mit Vernunft, Verstand, Einbil-
dungskraft, Glauben, Gefühl, Wahn und, wenn wir sonst nichts vermögen, mit
Albernheit zu überwinden (Goethe, Werke, vol. 13, 31).
As the emigrés’ conversations in the Unterhaltungen unfold, every one of
these approaches—from reason to silliness—seems to be in play. As Fritz’s
conjectures about the two desks show, the more we exercise our capacity for
scientifically grounded conjecture, the more we find ourselves engaging the
imagination as well, and indeed it is precisely at the point where explaining
the broken desk calls the relationship between experience and explanation
most directly into question that the narrative makes its leap into the unmiti-
gated fantasy of the fairy tale. Mooting an idea for the novella’s conclusion
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to Schiller, Goethe writes: “es würde vielleicht nicht übel sein, wenn [die
Unterhaltungen] durch ein Produkt der Einbildungskraft gleichsam ins Un-
endliche ausliefen” (Goethe, Gedenkausgabe, 96), and, true to this intention,
the concluding Märchen begins when Karl requests that Einbildungskraft be
at last untethered from the constraints of Vernunft and Verstand. The Unter-
haltungen had begun with the radical antinomy represented by Karl and the
Privy Councillor, had progressed by dialogically seeking harmony among
opposites, and now find their culmination in the bizarre alchemical attempt
at overarching synthesis represented by the Märchen. Making a somewhat
abrupt leap in the way it departs from the main narrative, this final tale delivers
the conclusion of Goethe’s experiment. With its exuberant play of ineffable
symbolic images, it may indeed be seen as perfecting, in a certain sense, what
the novella has progressively been working toward: the highest—perhaps
infinite?—form of Unterhaltung. “[E]s unterhält mich,” Goethe writes to
Schiller, “und wird also doch wohl auch einigermaßen für andere unterhaltend
sein” (100). “Unterhaltung” is of course conversation and diversion, but it is
also, as the novella illustrates, necessity and sustenance, and, in the case of
the Märchen, what appears for Goethe to be more a matter of diversion also
works to fulfill, in the context of Schiller’s project, a political and cultural
necessity. The Old Man, introducing this final tale, enigmatically announces
it as “ein Märchen, durch das Sie an nichts und an alles erinnert werden
sollen” (Goethe, Werke, vol. 6, 209), and in this sense, too, it may represent
a culmination of what the Unterhaltungen have sought to capture: overcoming
the foregoing individualism and antagonisms, the fairy tale seems to say
everything and nothing, to side with everyone and no one, and thereby to
arrive as far as it imaginably can from the novella’s fraught starting point.
Though richly laden with symbols, little of that meaning lies on the surface
for us to readily grasp. Yet while any intrinsic meaning is impossible to pin
down, the well-crafted unity of a poem is at the same time palpably present.
Unresolvable tensions seem at last to be resolved; this resolution occurs,
nevertheless, in a realm other than reality.
Thus completing the arc from a bald “Kampf entgegengesetzter Mei-
nungen und Parteien” to a fairy tale that symbolically transcends such politics,
the Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten answer—in a simultaneously
earnest and ironic way—Schiller’s call for “fröhliche Zerstreuung.” The lit-
erary experiment that Goethe carries out is one that tests both the capacity of
Schiller’s ideals to be embodied in representational narrative, and, conversely,
of the capacity of such narrative to rise to Schiller’s conceptual challenges.
The outcome of these experiments—and, we may infer, the result of any
attempt to thoroughly synthesize the incongruous manifold of experience—
is, for Goethe, a very vivid fairy tale. Like the Baroness, or Luise, or Fritz,
we are, by our natures, compelled to look for unity, coherence, and reason in
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the things we perceive, even if the narratives we squeeze experience into may
ultimately, as Goethe provocatively suggests, be just a diversion. In the Un-
terhaltungen, Goethe decidedly foregrounds the discontinuities and inconsis-
tencies within narrative in order thereby to foreground the analogous discon-
tinuities and inconsistencies of experience itself, and, in doing so, to show
the problems of attempting to systematize it. Thus responding to the logically
ordered narratives of history that had been gaining prominence since the En-
lightenment, and seemingly critiquing—already before the fact—the more
ambitious systematizations of history of philosophers from Hegel onward,
Goethe produces a methodologically earnest jest that engages in contempo-
rary dialogue about politics at the same time that it debunks it. Experience is
fraught with chance, he believes, and, like fairy tales, discursive attempts to
transcend its inconsistencies will only evade reality rather than capture it.
Narrative strategies that foreground imperfection, meanwhile, have their own
virtues, because those very imperfections—even the most maddeningly in-
scrutable ones—are the hallmarks of the reality we seek to grasp. “Sie sollten
sich doch endlich diese Paradoxen abgewöhnen, die das Gespräch nur ver-
wirren,” exclaimed Luise in exasperation at the Old Man’s perplexing way
of talking. “[E]rklären Sie sich deutlicher! [ . . . ] Hätten Sie sich eigentlicher
ausgedrückt, so hätten wir nicht gestritten.” “Aber auch nicht gesprochen,”
the Old Man replies. “Verwirrungen und Mißverständnisse sind die Quellen
des tätigen Lebens und der Unterhaltung” (186).
1 According to Tang, the relation of the particular to the general is not just central to
Goethe’s novella, but indeed, historically, to the genre itself. “The novella first came into being
as a legal genre” in the Roman Empire, he writes, and it emerged “as a literary genre [ . . . ] at
the height of the reception of Roman law in fourteenth-century Italy” (Tang, 67, 69). Common
to both the legal and the literary iterations of the novella is “its function: it seeks to turn factual
contingency into a stable normative order” (69); thus, “Boccaccio’s literary novella resembles
Justinian’s legal novella in that both make a normative order out of the factual circumstances
of singular cases” (71). Suggesting a deep consistency in Goethe’s thought, this reading of the
Unterhaltungen demonstrates the same core conceptual problem–relating singular instances to
general laws–that one finds thematized in the work’s philosophical and scientific intertexts.
2 The most thorough exposition of this dialogue is in Gaier.
3 The Old Man’s remark adumbrates an epistemological problem further thematized in
Goethe’s later scientific writing: “in der Idee [ist] Simultanes und Sukzessives innigst verbun-
den, auf dem Standpunkt der Erfahrung hingegen immer getrennt, und eine Naturwirkung, die
wir der Idee gemäß als simultan und sukzesssiv denken sollen, scheint uns in eine Art Wahnsinn
zu versetzen” (Goethe, Werke, vol. 13, 31–32).
4 On the critique of Newton with regard to the Unterhaltungen, see Sullivan, 158 f.
5 See, for example, the 1798 essay “Erfahrung und Wissenschaft”: “Denn da der Beo-
bachter nie das reine Phänomen mit Augen sieht, sondern vieles von seiner Geistesstimmung,
von der Stimmung des Organs im Augenblick, von Licht, Luft, Witterung, Körpern, Behandlung
und tausend andern Umständen abhängt; so ist ein Meer auszutrinken, wenn man sich an In-
dividualität des Phänomens halten und diese beobachten, messen, wägen und beschreiben will”
(Goethe, Werke, vol. 13, 24).
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